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Abstract
This report introduces general ideas and some basic methods of the Bayesian probability
theory applied to physics measurements. Our aim is to make the reader familiar, through ex-
amples rather than rigorous formalism, with concepts such as: model comparison (including
the automatic Ockham’s Razor filter provided by the Bayesian approach); parametric infer-
ence; quantification of the uncertainty about the value of physical quantities, also taking
into account systematic effects; role of marginalization; posterior characterization; predic-
tive distributions; hierarchical modelling and hyperparameters; Gaussian approximation of
the posterior and recovery of conventional methods, especially maximum likelihood and chi-
square fits under well defined conditions; conjugate priors, transformation invariance and
maximum entropy motivated priors; Monte Carlo estimates of expectation, including a short
introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. 0
1 Introduction
The last decades of 20th century have seen an intense expansion in the use of Bayesian methods in
all fields of human activity that generally deal with uncertainty, including engineering, computer
science, economics, medicine and even forensics (Kadane and Schum 1996). Bayesian networks
(Pearl 1988, Cowell et al 1999) are used to diagrammatically represent uncertainty in expert
systems or to construct artificial intelligence systems. Even venerable metrological associations,
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO 1993), the Deutsches Institut
fu¨r Normung (DIN 1996, 1999), and the USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
(Taylor and Kuyatt 1994), have come to realize that Bayesian ideas are essential to provide
general methods for quantifying uncertainty in measurements. A short account of the Bayesian
upsurge can be found in a Science article (Malakoff 1999). A search on the web for the keywords
‘Bayesian,’ ‘Bayesian network,’ or ‘belief network’ gives one a dramatic impression of this ‘rev-
olution,’ not only in terms of improved methods, but more importantly in terms of reasoning.
An overview of recent developments in Bayesian statistics, may be found in the proceedings of
the Valencia Conference series. The last published volume was (Bernardo et al 1999), and the
most recent conference was held in June 2002. Another series of workshops, under the title
of Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods, has focused more on applications in the physical
sciences.
It is surprising that many physicists have been slow to adopt these ‘new’ ideas. There have
been notable exceptions, of course, many of whom have contributed to the abovementioned
Maximum Entropy workshops. One reason to be surprised is because numerous great physicists
and mathematicians have played important roles in developing probability theory. These ‘new’
ideas actually originated long ago with Bernoulli, Laplace, and Gauss, just to mention a few
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who contributed significantly to the development of physics, as well as to Bayesian thinking.
So, while modern statisticians and mathematicians are developing powerful methods to apply
to Bayesian analysis, most physicists, in their use and reasoning in statistics still rely on 20th
century ‘frequentist prescriptions’ (D’Agostini 1999a, 2000).
We hope that this report will help fill this gap by reviewing the advantages of using the
Bayesian approach to address physics problems. We will emphasize more the intuitive and
practical aspects than the theoretical ones. We will not try to cover all possible applications of
Bayesian analysis in physics, but mainly concentrate on some basic applications that illustrate
clearly the power of the method and how naturally it meshes with physicists’ approach to their
science.
The vocabulary, expressions, and examples have been chosen with the intent to correspond,
as closely as possible, to the education that physicists receive in statistics, instead of a more
rigorous approach that formal Bayesian statisticians might prefer. For example, we avoid many
important theoretical concepts, like exchangeability, and do not attempt to prove the basic rules
of probability. When we talk about ‘random variables,’ we will in fact mean ‘uncertain variables,’
and instead of referring to the frequentist concept of ‘randomness’ a` la von Mises (1957). This
distinction will be clarified later.
In the past, presentations on Bayesian probability theory often start with criticisms of ‘con-
ventional,’ that is, frequentist ideas, methods, and results. We shall keep criticisms and detailed
comparisons of the results of different methods to a minimum. Readers interested in a critical
review of conventional frequentist statistics will find a large literature, because most introduc-
tory books or reports on Bayesian analysis contain enough material on this matter. See (Gelman
et al 1995, Sivia 1997, D’Agostini 1999c, Jaynes 1998, Loredo 1990) and the references therein.
Eloquent ‘defenses of the Bayesian choice’ can be found in (Howson and Urbach 1993, Robert
2001).
Some readers may wish to have references to unbiased comparisons of frequentist to Bayesian
ideas and methods. To our knowledge, no such reports exist. Those who claim to be impartial
are often frequentists who take some Bayesian results as if they were frequentist ‘prescriptions,’
not caring whether all underlying hypotheses apply. For two prominent papers of this kind,
see the articles by Efron (1986a) [with follow up discussions by Lindley (1989), Zellner (1986),
and Efron (1986b)] and Cousins (1995). A recent, pragmatic comparisons of frequentist and
Bayesian confidence limits can be found in (Zech 2002).
Despite its lack of wide-spread use in physics, and its complete absence in physics courses
(D’Agostini 1999a), Bayesian data analysis is increasingly being employed in many areas of
physics, for example, in astronomy (Gregory and Loredo 1992, 1996, Gregory 1999, Babu and
Feigelson 1992, 1997, Bontekoe et al 1994), in geophysics (Glimm and Sharp 1999), in high-
energy physics (D’Agostini and Degrassi 1999, Ciuchini et al 2001), in image reconstruction
(Hanson 1993), in microscopy (Higdon and Yamamoto 2001), in quantum Monte Carlo (Guber-
natis et al 1991), and in spectroscopy (Skilling 1992, Fischer et al 1997, 1998, 2000), just to
mention a few articles written in the last decade. Other examples will be cited throughout the
paper.
2 Uncertainty and probability
In the practice of science, we constantly find ourselves in a state of uncertainty. Uncertainty
about the data that an experiment shall yield. Uncertainty about the true value of a physical
quantity, even after an experiment has been done. Uncertainty about model parameters, cali-
bration constants, and other quantities that might influence the outcome of the experiment, and
hence influence our conclusions about the quantities of interest, or the models that might have
produced the observed results.
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In general, we know through experience that not all the events that could happen, or all
conceivable hypotheses, are equally likely. Let us consider the outcome of you measuring the
temperature at the location where you are presently reading this paper, assuming you use a
digital thermometer with one degree resolution (or you round the reading at the degree if you
have a more precise instrument). There are some values of the thermometer display you are
more confident to read, others you expect less, and extremes you do not believe at all (some
of them are simply excluded by the thermometer you are going to use). Given two events E1
and E2, for example E1 : “T = 22
◦C” and E2 : “T = 33
◦C”, you might consider E2 much more
probable than E1, just meaning that you believe E2 to happen more than E1. We could use
different expressions to mean exactly the same thing: you consider E2 more likely; you are more
confident in E2; having to choose between E1 and E2 to win a price, you would promptly choose
E2; having to classify with a number, that we shall denote with P , your degree of confidence on
the two outcomes, you would write P (E2) > P (E1); and many others.
On the other hand, we would rather state the opposite, i.e. P (E1) > P (E2), with the same
meaning of symbols and referring exactly to the same events: what you are going to read at your
place with your thermometer. The reason is simply because we do not share the same status of
information. We do not know who you are and where you are in this very moment. You and
we are uncertain about the same event, but in a different way. Values that might appear very
probable to you now, appear quite improbable, though not impossible, to us.
In this example we have introduced two crucial aspects of the Bayesian approach:
1. As it is used in everyday language, the term probability has the intuitive meaning of “the
degree of belief that an event will occur.”
2. Probability depends on our state of knowledge, which is usually different for different
people. In other words, probability is unavoidably subjective.
At this point, you might find all of this quite natural, and wonder why these intuitive concepts
go by the esoteric name ‘Bayesian.’ We agree! The fact is that the main thrust of statistics theory
and practice during the 20th century has been based on a different concept of probability, in
which it is defined as the limit of the long-term relative frequency of the outcome of these events.
It revolves around the theoretical notion of infinite ensembles of ‘identical experiments.’ Without
entering an unavoidably long critical discussion of the frequentist approach, we simply want to
point out that in such a framework, there is no way to introduce the probability of hypotheses.
All practical methods to overcome this deficiency yield misleading, and even absurd, conclusions.
See (D’Agostini 1999c) for several examples and also for a justification of why frequentistic test
‘often work’.
Instead, if we recover the intuitive concept of probability, we are able to talk in a natural
way about the probability of any kind of event, or, extending the concept, of any proposition. In
particular, the probability evaluation based on the relative frequency of similar events occurred
in the past is easily recovered in the Bayesian theory, under precise condition of validity (see
Sect. 5.3). Moreover, a simple theorem from probability theory, Bayes’ theorem, which we shall
see in the next section, allows us to update probabilities on the basis of new information. This
inferential use of Bayes’ theorem is only possible if probability is understood in terms of degree
of belief. Therefore, the terms ‘Bayesian’ and ‘based on subjective probability’ are practically
synonyms,and usually mean ‘in contrast to the frequentist, or conventional, statistics.’ The
terms ‘Bayesian’ and ‘subjective’ should be considered transitional. In fact, there is already the
tendency among many Bayesians to simply refer to ‘probabilistic methods,’ and so on (Jeffreys
1961, de Finetti 1974, Jaynes 1998 and Cowell et al 1999).
As mentioned above, Bayes’ theorem plays a fundamental role in the probability theory.
This means that subjective probabilities of logically connected events are related to each other
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by mathematical rules. This important result can be summed up by saying, in practical terms,
that ‘degrees of belief follow the same grammar as abstract axiomatic probabilities.’ Hence, all
formal properties and theorems from probability theory follow.
Within the Bayesian school, there is no single way to derive the basic rules of probability (note
that they are not simply taken as axioms in this approach). de Finetti’s principle of coherence
(de Finetti 1974) is considered the best guidance by many leading Bayesians (Bernardo and
Smith 1994, O’Hagan 1994, Lad 1996 and Coletti and Scozzafava 2002). See (D’Agostini 1999c)
for an informal introduction to the concept of coherence, which in simple words can be outlined
as follows. A person who evaluates probability values should be ready to accepts bets in either
direction, with odd ratios calculated from those values of probability. For example, an analyst
that declares to be confident 50% on E should be aware that somebody could ask him to make
a 1:1 bet on E or on E. If he/she feels uneasy, it means that he/she does not consider the two
events equally likely and the 50% was ‘incoherent.’
Others, in particular practitioners close to the Jaynes’ Maximum Entropy school (Jaynes
1957a, 1957b) feel more at ease with Cox’s logical consistency reasoning, requiring some con-
sistency properties (‘desiderata’) between values of probability related to logically connected
propositions. (Cox 1946). See also (Jaynes 1998, Sivia 1997, and Fro¨hner 2000, and especially
Tribus 1969), for accurate derivations and a clear account of the meaning and role of information
entropy in data analysis. An approach similar to Cox’s is followed by Jeffreys (1961), another
leading figure who has contributed a new vitality to the methods based on this ‘new’ point
of view on probability. Note that Cox and Jeffreys were physicists. Remarkably, Schro¨dinger
(1947a, 1947b) also arrived at similar conclusions, though his definition of event is closer to the
de Finetti’s one. [Some short quotations from (Schro¨dinger 1947a) are in order. Definition of
probability: “. . . a quantitative measure of the strength of our conjecture or anticipation, founded
on the said knowledge, that the event comes true”. Subjective nature of probability: “Since the
knowledge may be different with different persons or with the same person at different times,
they may anticipate the same event with more or less confidence, and thus different numerical
probabilities may be attached to the same event.” Conditional probability: “Thus whenever we
speak loosely of ‘the probability of an event,’ it is always to be understood: probability with regard
to a certain given state of knowledge.”]
3 Rules of probability
We begin by stating some basic rules and general properties that form the ‘grammar’ of the
probabilistic language, which is used in Bayesian analysis. In this section, we review the rules
of probability, starting with the rules for simple propositions. We will not provide rigorous
derivations and will not address the foundational or philosophical aspects of probability theory.
Moreover, following an ‘eclectic’ approach which is common among Bayesian practitioners, we
talk indifferently about probability of events, probability of hypotheses or probability of propo-
sitions. Indeed, the last expression will be often favoured, understanding that it does include
the others.
3.1 Probability of simple propositions
Let us start by recalling the basic rules of probability for propositions or hypotheses. Let A and
B be propositions, which can take on only two values, for example, true or false. The notation
P (A) stands for the probability that A is true. The elementary rules of probability for simple
propositions are
0 ≤ P (A) ≤ 1; (1)
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P (Ω) = 1; (2)
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩B) . (3)
P (A ∩B) = P (A |B)P (B) = P (B |A)P (A) , (4)
where Ω means tautology (a proposition that is certainly true). The construct A∩B is true only
when both A and B are true (logical AND), while A ∪ B is true when at least one of the two
propositions is true (logical OR). A∩B is also written simply as ‘A,B’ or AB, and is also called
a logical product, while A∪B is also called a logical sum. P (A,B) is called the joint probability
of A and B. P (A |B) is the probability of A under that condition that B is true. We often read
it simply as “the probability of A, given B.” .
Equation (4) shows that the joint probability of two events can be decomposed into con-
ditional probabilities in different two ways. Either of these ways is called the product rule.
If the status of B does not change the probability of A, and the other way around, then A
and B are said to be independent, probabilistically independent to be precise. In that case,
P (A |B) = P (A), and P (B |A) = P (B), which, when inserted in Eq. (4), yields
P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B) ⇐⇒ probabilistic independence . (5)
Equations (1)–(4) logically lead to other rules which form the body of probability theory. For
example, indicating the negation (or opposite) of A with A, clearly A∪A is a tautology (A∪A =
Ω), and A ∩ A is a contradiction (A ∩ A = ∅). The symbol ∅ stands for contradiction (a
proposition that is certainly false). Hence, we obtain from Eqs. (2) and (3)
P (A) + P (A) = 1 , (6)
which says that proposition A is either true or not true.
3.2 Probability of complete classes
These formulae become more interesting when we consider a set of propositions Hj that all
together form a tautology (i.e., they are exhaustive) and are mutually exclusive. Formally
∪i Hj = Ω (7)
Hj ∩Hk = ∅ if j 6= k . (8)
When these conditions apply, the set {Hj} is said to form a complete class. The symbol H has
been chosen because we shall soon interpret {Hj} as a set of hypotheses.
The first (trivial) property of a complete class is normalization, that is∑
j
P (Hj) = 1 , (9)
which is just an extension of Eq. (6) to a complete class containing more than just a single
proposition and its negation.
For the complete class H, the generalizations of Eqs. (6) and the use of Eq. (4) yield:
P (A) =
∑
j
P (A,Hj) (10)
P (A) =
∑
j
P (A |Hj)P (Hj) . (11)
Equation (10) is the basis of what is called marginalization, which will become particularly
important when dealing with uncertain variables: the probability of A is obtained by the sum-
mation over all possible constituents contained in A. Hereafter, we avoid explicitly writing the
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limits of the summations, meaning that they extend over all elements of the class. The con-
stituents are ‘A,Hj ,’ which, based on the complete class of hypotheses {H}, themselves form
a complete class, which can be easily proved. Equation (11) shows that the probability of any
proposition is given by a weighted average of all conditional probabilities, subject to hypotheses
Hj forming a complete class, with the weight being the probability of the hypothesis.
In general, there are many ways to choose complete classes (like ‘bases’ in geometrical spaces).
Let us denote the elements of a second complete class by Ei. The constituents are then formed
by the elements (Ei,Hj) of the Cartesian product {E} × {H}. Equations (10) and (11) then
become the more general statements
P (Ei) =
∑
j
P (Ei,Hj) (12)
P (Ei) =
∑
j
P (Ei |Hj)P (Hj) (13)
and, symmetrically,
P (Hj) =
∑
i
P (Ei,Hj) (14)
P (Hj) =
∑
i
P (Hj |Ei)P (Ei) . (15)
The reason we write these formulae both ways is to stress the symmetry of Bayesian reasoning
with respect to classes {E} and {H}, though we shall soon associate them with observations (or
events) and hypotheses, respectively.
3.3 Probability rules for uncertain variables
In analyzing the data from physics experiments, we need to deal with measurement that are
discrete or continuous in nature. Our aim is to make inferences about the models that we believe
appropriately describe the physical situation, and/or, within a given model, to determine the
values of relevant physics quantities. Thus, we need the probability rules that apply to uncertain
variables, whether they are discrete or continuous. The rules for complete classes described in
the preceding section clearly apply directly to discrete variables. With only slight changes, the
same rules also apply to continuous variables because they may be thought of as a limit of
discrete variables, as interval between possible discrete values goes to zero.
For a discrete variable x, the expression p(x), which is called a probability function, has
the interpretation in terms of the probability of the proposition P (A), where A is true when
the value of the variable is equal to x. In the case of continuous variables, we use the same
notation, but with the meaning of a probability density function (pdf). So p(x) dx, in terms of
a proposition, is the probability P (A), where A is true when the value of the variable lies in
the range of x to x+ dx. In general, the meaning is clear from the context; otherwise it should
be stated. Probabilities involving more than one variable, like p(x, y), have the meaning of the
probability of a logical product; they are usually called joint probabilities.
Table 1 summarizes useful formulae for discrete and continuous variables. The interpretation
and use of these relations in Bayesian inference will be illustrated in the following sections.
4 Bayesian inference for simple problems
We introduce the basic concepts of Bayesian inference by considering some simple problems.
The aim is to illustrate some of the notions that form the foundation of Bayesian reasoning.
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Table 1: Some definitions and properties of probability functions for values of a discrete variable
xi and probability density functions for continuous variables x. All summations and integrals
are understood to extend over the full range of possibilities of the variable. Note that the
expectation of the variable is also called expected value (sometimes expectation value), average
and mean. The square root of the variance is the standard deviation σ.
discrete variables continuous variables
probability P (X = xi) = p(xi) dP[x≤X≤x+dx] = p(x) dx
normalization†
∑
i p(xi) = 1
∫
p(x) dx = 1
expectation of f(X) E[f(X)] =
∑
i f(xi) p(xi) E[f(X)] =
∫
f(x) p(x) dx
expected value E(X) =
∑
i xi p(xi) E(X) =
∫
x p(x) dx
moment of order r Mr(X) =
∑
i x
r
i p(xi) Mr(X) =
∫
xr p(x) dx
variance σ2 =
∑
i[xi − E(X)]2 p(xi) σ2 =
∫
[x− E(X)]2 p(x) dx
product rule p(xi, yj) = p(xi | yj) p(yj) p(x, y) = p(x | y) p(y)
independence p(xi, yj) = p(xi) p(yj) p(x, y) = p(x) p(y)
marginalization
∑
j p(xi, yj) = p(xi)
∫
p(x, y) dy = p(x)
decomposition p(xi) =
∑
j p(xi |yj) p(yj) p(x) =
∫
p(x | y) p(y) dy
Bayes’ theorem p(xj | yi) = p(yi |xj) p(xj)∑
j p(yi |xj) p(xj) p(x | y) =
p(y |x) p(x)∫
p(y |x) p(x) dx
likelihood L(xj ; yi) = p(yi |xj) L(x ; y) = p(y |x)
†A function p(x) such that
∑
i
p(xi) =∞, or
∫
p(x) dx =∞, is called improper. Improper
functions are often used to describe relative beliefs about the possible values of a variable.
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4.1 Background information
As we think about drawing conclusions about the physical world, we come to realize that ev-
erything we do is based on what we know about the world. Conclusions about hypotheses will
be based on our general background knowledge. To emphasize the dependence of probability on
the state of background information, which we designate as I, we will make it explicit by writing
P (E | I), rather than simply P (E). (Note that, in general, P (A | I1) 6= P (A | I2), if I1 and I2 are
different states of information.) For example, Eq. (4) should be more precisely written as
P (A ∩B | I) = P (A |B ∩ I)P (B | I) = P (B |A ∩ I)P (A | I) , (16)
or alternatively as
P (A,B | I) = P (A |B, I)P (B | I) = P (B |A, I)P (A | I) . (17)
We have explicitly included I as part of the conditional to remember that any probability relation
is valid only under the same state of background information.
4.2 Bayes’ theorem
Formally, Bayes’ theorem follows from the symmetry of P (A,B) expressed by Eq. (17). In terms
of Ei and Hj belonging to two different complete classes, Eq. (17) yields
P (Hj |Ei, I)
P (Hj | I) =
P (Ei |Hj , I)
P (Ei | I) (18)
This equation says that the new condition Ei alters our belief in Hj by the same updating factor
by which the condition Hj alters our belief about Ei. Rearrangement yields Bayes’ theorem
P (Hj |Ei, I) = P (Ei |Hj , I)P (Hj | I)
P (Ei | I) . (19)
We have obtained a logical rule to update our beliefs on the basis of new conditions. Note that,
though Bayes’ theorem is a direct consequence of the basic rules of axiomatic probability theory,
its updating power can only be fully exploited if we can treat on the same basis expressions
concerning hypotheses and observations, causes and effects, models and data.
In most practical cases, the evaluation of P (Ei | I) can be quite difficult, while determining
the conditional probability P (Ei |Hj, I) might be easier. For example, think of Ei as the prob-
ability of observing a particular event topology in a particle physics experiment, compared with
the probability of the same thing given a value of the hypothesized particle mass (Hj), a given
detector, background conditions, etc. Therefore, it is convenient to rewrite P (Ei | I) in Eq. (19)
in terms of the quantities in the numerator, using Eq. (13), to obtain
P (Hj |Ei, I) = P (Ei |Hj, I)P (Hj | I)∑
j P (Ei |Hj, I)P (Hj | I)
, (20)
which is the better-known form of Bayes’ theorem. Written this way, it becomes evident that
the denominator of the r.h.s. of Eq. (20) is just a normalization factor and we can focus on just
the numerator:
P (Hj |Ei, I) ∝ P (Ei |Hj, I)P (Hj | I) . (21)
In words
posterior ∝ likelihood × prior , (22)
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where the posterior (or final state) stands for the probability of Hj, based on the new observation
Ei, relative to the prior (or initial) probability. (Prior probabilities are often indicated with P0.)
The conditional probability P (Ei |Hj) is called the likelihood. It is literally the probability of the
observation Ei given the specific hypothesis Hj. The term likelihood can lead to some confusion,
because it is often misunderstood to mean “the likelihood that Ei comes from Hj.” However,
this name implies to consider P (Ei |Hj) a mathematical function of Hj for a fixed Ei and in
that framework it is usually written as L(Hj;Ei) to emphasize the functionality. We caution
the reader that one sometimes even finds the notation L(Ei |Hj) to indicate exactly P (Ei |Hj).
4.3 Inference for simple hypotheses
Making use of formulae (20) or (21), we can easily solve many classical problems involving
inference when many hypotheses can produce the same single effect. Consider the case of
interpreting the results of a test for the HIV virus applied to a randomly chosen European.
Clinical tests are very seldom perfect. Suppose that the test accurately detects infection, but
has a false-positive rate of 0.2%:
P (Positive | Infected) = 1 , and P (Positive | Infected) = 0.2% .
If the test is positive, can we conclude that the particular person is infected with a probability
of 99.8% because the test has only a 0.2% chance of mistake? Certainly not! This kind of
mistake is often made by those who are not used to Bayesian reasoning, including scientists who
make inferences in their own field of expertise. The correct answer depends on what we else
know about the person tested, that is, the background information. Thus, we have to consider
the incidence of the HIV virus in Europe, and possibly, information about the lifestyle of the
individual. For details, see (D’Agostini 1999c).
To better understand the updating mechanism, let us take the ratio of Eq. (20) for two
hypotheses Hj and Hk
P (Hj |Ei, I)
P (Hk |Ei, I) =
P (Ei |Hj, I)
P (Ei |Hk, I)
P (Hj | I)
P (Hk | I) , (23)
where the sums in the denominators of Eq. (20) cancel. It is convenient to interpret the ratio
of probabilities, given the same condition, as betting odds. This is best done formally in the de
Finetti approach, but the basic idea is what everyone is used to: the amount of money that
one is willing to bet on an event is proportional to the degree to which one expects that event
will happen. Equation (23) tells us that, when new information is available, the initial odds are
updated by the ratio of the likelihoods P (Ei |Hj, I)/P (Ei |Hk, I), which is known as the Bayes
factor.
In the case of the HIV test, the initial odds for an arbitrarily chosen European to be in-
fected P (Hj | I)/P (Hk | I) are so small that we need a very high Bayes’ factor to be reasonably
certain that, when the test is positive, the person is really infected. With the numbers used
in this example, the Bayes factor is 500 = 1/0.002. For example, if we take for the prior
P0(Infected)/P0(Infected) = 1/1000, the Bayes’ factor changes these odds to 500/1000 = 1/2,
or equivalently, the probability that the person is infected would be 1/3, quite different from
the 99.8% answer usually prompted by those who have a standard statistical education. This
example can be translated straightforwardly to physical problems, like particle identification in
the analysis of a Cherenkov detector data, as done, e.g. in (D’Agostini 1999c).
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5 Inferring numerical values of physics quantities — General
ideas and basic examples
In physics we are concerned about models (’theories’) and the numerical values of physical
quantities related to them. Models and the value of quantities are, generally speaking, the
hypothesis we want to infer, given the observations. In the previous section we have learned
how to deal with simple hypotheses, ‘simple’ in the sense that they do not depend on internal
parameters.
On the other hand, in many applications we have strong beliefs about what model to use
to interpret the measurements. Thus, we focus our attention on the model parameters, which
we consider as uncertain variables that we want to infer. The method which deals with these
applications is usually referred as parametric inference, and it will be shown with examples in
this section. In our models, the value of the relevant physical quantities are usually described
in terms of a continuous uncertain variable. Bayes’ theorem, properly extended to uncertain
quantities (see Tab.1), plays a central role in this inference process.
A more complicate case is when we are also uncertain about the model (and each possible
model has its own set of parameter, usually associated with different physics quantities). We
shall analyse this problem in Sect. 7.
5.1 Bayesian inference on uncertain variables and posterior characterization
We start here with a few one-dimensional problems involving simple models that often occur in
data analysis. These examples will be used to illustrate some of the most important Bayesian
concepts. Let us first introduce briefly the structure of the Bayes’ theorem in the form convenient
to our purpose, as a straightforward extension of what was seen in Sect. 4.2.
p(θ | d, I) = p(d | θ, I) p(θ | I)∫
p(d | θ, I) p(θ | I) dθ . (24)
θ is the generic name of the parameter (used hereafter, unless the models have traditional symbols
for their parameters) and d is the data point. p(θ | I) is the prior, p(θ | d, I) the posterior and
p(d | θ, I) the likelihood. Also in this case the likelihood is is often written as L(θ; d) = p(d | θ, I),
and the same words of caution expressed in Sect. 4.2 apply here too. Note, moreover, that, while
p(d | θ, I) is a properly normalized pdf, L(θ; d) has not a pdf meaning in the variable θ. Hence,
the integral of L(θ; d) over θ is only accidentally equal to unity. The denominator in the r.h.s.
of Eq. (24) is called the evidence and, while in the parametric inference discussed here is just a
trivial normalization factor, its value becomes important for model comparison (see Sect. 7).
Posterior probability distributions provide the full description of our state of knowledge about
the value of the quantity. In fact, they allow to calculate all probability intervals of interest. Such
intervals are also called credible intervals (at a specified level of probability, for example 95%) or
confidence intervals (at a specified level of ’confidence’, i.e. of probability). However, the latter
expression could be confused with frequentistic ’confidence intervals’, that are not probabilistic
statements about uncertain variables (D’Agostini 1999c).
It is often desirable to characterize the distribution in terms of a few numbers. For example,
mean value (arithmetic average) of the posterior, or its most probable value (the mode) of
the posterior, also known as the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate. The spread of the
distribution is often described in terms of its standard deviation (square root of the variance).
It is useful to associate the terms mean value and standard deviation with the more inferential
terms expected value, or simply expectation (value), indicated by E( ), and standard uncertainty
(ISO 1993), indicated by σ( ), where the argument is the uncertain variable of interest. This
will be our standard way of reporting the result of inference in a quantitative way, though, we
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emphasize that the full answer is given by the posterior distribution, and reporting only these
summaries in case of the complex distributions (e.g. multimodal and/or asymmetrical pdf’s)
can be misleading, because people tend to think of a Gaussian model if no further information
is provided.
5.2 Gaussian model
Let us start with a classical example in which the response signal d from a detector is described
by a Gaussian error function around the true value µ with a standard deviation σ, which is
assumed to be exactly known. This model is the best-known among physicists and, indeed, the
Gaussian pdf is also known as normal because it is often assumed that errors are ’normally’
distributed according to this function. Applying Bayes’ theorem for continuous variables (see
Tab. 1), from the likelihood
p(d |µ, I) = 1√
2pi σ
exp
[
−(d− µ)
2
2σ2
]
(25)
we get for µ
p(µ | d, I) =
1√
2pi σ
exp
[
−(d− µ)
2
2σ2
]
p(µ | I)
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2pi σ
exp
[
−(d− µ)
2
2σ2
]
p(µ | I) dµ
. (26)
Considering all values of µ equally likely over a very large interval, we can model the prior
p(µ | I) with a constant, which simplifies in Eq. (26), yielding
p(µ | d, I) = 1√
2pi σ
exp
[
−(µ− d)
2
2σ2
]
. (27)
Expectation and standard deviation of the posterior distribution are E(µ) = d and σ(µ) = σ,
respectively. This particular result corresponds to what is often done intuitively in practice.
But one has to pay attention to the assumed conditions under which the result is logically valid:
Gaussian likelihood and uniform prior. Moreover, we can speak about the probability of true
values only in the subjective sense. It is recognized that physicists, and scientists in general, are
highly confused about this point (D’Agostini 1999a).
A noteworthy case of a prior for which the naive inversion gives paradoxical results is when
the value of a quantity is constrained to be in the ‘physical region,’ for example µ ≥ 0, while
d falls outside it (or it is at its edge). The simplest prior that cures the problem is a step
function θ(µ), and the result is equivalent to simply renormalizing the pdf in the physical region
(this result corresponds to a ‘prescription’ sometimes used by practitioners with a frequentist
background when they encounter this kind of problem).
Another interesting case is when the prior knowledge can be modeled with a Gaussian func-
tion, for example, describing our knowledge from a previous inference
p(µ |µ0, σ0, I) = 1√
2pi σ0
exp
[
−(µ− µ0)
2
2σ20
]
. (28)
Inserting Eq. (28) into Eq. (26), we get
p(µ | d, µ0, σ0, I) = 1√
2pi σ1
exp
[
−(µ− µ1)
2
2σ21
]
, (29)
11
where
µ1 = E(µ) =
d/σ2 + µ0/σ
2
0
1/σ2 + 1/σ20
(30)
=
σ20
σ2 + σ20
d+
σ2
σ2 + σ20
µ0 =
σ21
σ2
d+
σ21
σ20
µ0 (31)
σ21 = Var(µ) =
(
σ−20 + σ
−2
)−1
(32)
We can then see that the case p(µ | I) = constant corresponds to the limit of a Gaussian prior with
very large σ0 and finite µ0. The formula for the expected value combining previous knowledge
and present experimental information has been written in several ways in Eq. (31).
Another enlighting way of writing Eq. (30) is considering µ0 and µ1 the estimates of µ at
times t0 and t1, respectively before and after the observation d happened at time t1. Indicating
the estimates at different times by µˆ(t), we can rewrite Eq. (30) as
µˆ(t1) =
σ2µ(t0)
σ2d(t1) + σ
2
µ(t0)
d(t1) +
σ2d(t1)
σ2d(t1) + σ
2
µ(t0)
µˆ(t0)
= µˆ(t0) +
σ2µ(t0)
σ2d(t1) + σ
2
µ(t0)
[d(t1)− µˆ(t0)] (33)
= µˆ(t0) +K(t1) [d(t1)− µˆ(t0)] (34)
σ2µ(t1) = σ
2
µ(t0)−K(t1)σ2µ(t0) , (35)
where
K(t1) =
σ2µ(t0)
σ2d(t1) + σ
2
µ(t0)
. (36)
Indeed, we have given Eq. (30) the structure of a Kalman filter (Kalman 1960). The new obser-
vation ‘corrects’ the estimate by a quantity given by the innovation (or residual) [d(t1)− µˆ(t0)]
times the blending factor (or gain) K(t1). For an introduction about Kalman filter and its
probabilistic origin, see (Maybeck 1979 and Welch and Bishop 2002).
As Eqs. (31)–(35) show, a new experimental information reduces the uncertainty. But this
is true as long the previous information and the observation are somewhat consistent. If we are,
for several reasons, sceptical about the model which yields the combination rule (31)–(32), we
need to remodel the problem and introduce possible systematic errors or underestimations of
the quoted standard deviations, as done e.g. in (Press 1997, Dose and von der Linden 1999,
D’Agostini 1999b, Fro¨hner 2000).
5.3 Binomial model
In a large class of experiments, the observations consist of counts, that is, a number of things
(events, occurrences, etc.). In many processes of physics interests the resulting number of counts
is described probabilistically by a binomial or a Poisson model. For example, we want to draw
an inference about the efficiency of a detector, a branching ratio in a particle decay or a rate
from a measured number of counts in a given interval of time.
The binomial distribution describes the probability of randomly obtaining n events (‘suc-
cesses’) in N independent trials, in each of which we assume the same probability θ that the
event will happen. The probability function is
p(n | θ,N) =
(
N
n
)
θn(1− θ)N−n , (37)
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Figure 1: Posterior probability density function of the binomial parameter θ, having observed n
successes in N trials.
where the leading factor is the well-known binomial coefficient, namely N !/n!(N − n)!. We wish
to infer θ from an observed number of counts n in N trials. Incidentally, that was the “problem
in the doctrine of chances” originally treated by Bayes (1763), reproduced e.g. in (Press 1992).
Assuming a uniform prior for θ, by Bayes’ theorem the posterior distribution for θ is proportional
to the likelihood, given by Eq. (37):
p(θ |n,N, I) = θ
n (1− θ)N−n∫ 1
0 θ
n (1− θ)N−n dθ (38)
=
(N + 1)!
n! (N − n)! θ
n (1− θ)N−n . (39)
Some examples of this distribution for various values of n and N are shown in Fig. 1. Expec-
tation, variance, and mode of this distribution are:
E(θ) =
n+ 1
N + 2
(40)
σ2(θ) =
(n + 1)(N − n+ 1)
(N + 3)(N + 2)2
=
E(θ) (1− E(θ))
N + 3
(41)
θm =
n
N
, (42)
where the mode has been indicated with θm. Equation (40) is known as the Laplace formula. For
large values of N and 0≪ n≪ N the expectation of θ tends to θm, and p(θ) becomes approxi-
mately Gaussian. This result is nothing but a reflection of the well-known asymptotic Gaussian
behavior of p(n | θ,N). For large N the uncertainty about θ goes like 1/√N . Asymptotically, we
are practically certain that θ is equal to the relative frequency of that class of events observed
in the past. This is how the frequency based evaluation of probability is promptly recovered in
the Bayesian approach, under well defined assumptions.
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Figure 2: The posterior distribution for the Poisson parameter λ, when n counts are observed
in an experiment.
5.4 Poisson model
The Poisson distribution gives the probability of observing n counts in a fixed time interval,
when the expectation of the number of counts to be observed is λ:
p(n |λ) = λ
ne−λ
n!
. (43)
The inverse problem is to infer λ from n counts observed. (Note that what physically matters
is the rate r = λ/∆T , where ∆T is the observation time.) Applying Bayes’ theorem and using
a uniform prior p(λ | I) for λ, we get
p(λ |n, I) =
λn e−λ
n!∫ ∞
0
λn e−λ
n!
dλ
=
λn e−λ
n!
. (44)
As for the Gaussian model, the same mathematical expression holds for the likelihood, but with
interchanged role of variable and parameter. Expectation and variance of λ are both equal
to n + 1, while the most probable value is λm = n. For large n, the extra ‘+1’ (due to the
asymmetry of the prior with respect to λ = 0) can be ignored and we have E(λ) = σ2(λ) ≈ n
and, once again, the uncertainty about λ follows a Gaussian model. The relative uncertainty on
λ decreases as 1/
√
n.
When the observed value of n is zero, Eq. (44) yields p(λ |n = 0) = e−λ, giving a maximum
of belief at zero, but an exponential tail toward large values of λ. Expected value and standard
deviation of λ are both equal to 1. The 95% probabilistic upper bound of λ is at λ95%UB = 3,
as it can be easily calculated solving the equation
∫ λ95%UB
0 p(λ |n = 0) dλ = 0.95. Note that also
this result depends on the choice of prior, though Astone and D’Agostini (1999) have shown
that the upper bound is insensitive to the exact form of the prior, if the prior models somehow
what they call “positive attitude of rational scientists” (the prior has not to be in contradiction
with what one could actually observe, given the detector sensitivity). In particular, they show
that a uniform prior is a good practical choice to model this attitude. On the other hand,
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talking about ‘objective’ probabilistic upper/lower limits makes no sense, as discussed in detail
and with examples in the cited paper: one can at most speak about conventionally defined
non-probabilistic sensitivity bounds, which separate the measurement region from that in which
experimental sensitivity is lost (Astone and D’Agostini 1999, D’Agostini 2000, Astone et al
2002).
5.5 Inference from a data set and sequential use of Bayes formula
In the elementary examples shown above, the inference has been done from a single data point
d. If we have a set of observations (data), indicated by d, we just need to insert in the Bayes
formula the likelihood p(d | θ, I), where this expression indicates a multi-dimensional joint pdf.
Note that we could think of inferring θ on the basis of each newly observed datum di. After
the one observation:
p(θ | d1, I) ∝ p(d1 | θ, I) p(θ | I) (45)
and after the second:
p(θ | d1, d2, I) ∝ p(d2 | θ, d1, I) p(θ | d1, I) (46)
∝ p(d2 | θ, d1, I) p(d1 | θ, I) p(θ | I) . (47)
We have written Eq. (47) in a way that the dependence between observables can be accommo-
dated. From the product rule in Tab. 1, we can rewrite Eq. (47) as
p(θ | d1, d2, I) ∝ p(d1, d2 | θ, I) p(θ | I) . (48)
Comparing this equation with (47) we see that the sequential inference gives exactly the same
result of a single inference that properly takes into account all available information. This is an
important result of the Bayesian approach.
The extension to many variables is straightforward, obtaining
p(θ |d, I) ∝ p(d |θ, I) p(θ | I) . (49)
Furthermore, when the di are independent, we get for the likelihood
p(d |θ, I) =
∏
i
p(di |θ, I) (50)
L(θ;d) =
∏
i
L(θ; di) , (51)
that is, the combined likelihood is given by the product of the individual likelihoods.
5.6 Multidimensional case — Inferring µ and σ of a Gaussian
So far we have only inferred one parameter of a model. The extension to many parameters is
straightforward. Calling θ the set of parameters and d the data, Bayes’ theorem becomes
p(θ |d, I) = p(d |θ, I) p(θ | I)∫
p(d |θ, I) p(θ | I) dθ . (52)
Equation (52) gives the posterior for the full parameter vector θ. Marginalization (see Tab. 1)
allows one to calculate the probability distribution for a single parameter, for example, p(θi |d, I),
by integrating over the remaining parameters. The marginal distribution p(θi |d, I) is then the
complete result of the Bayesian inference on the parameter θi. Though the characterization
of the marginal is done in the usual way described in Sect. 5.1, there is often the interest to
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summarize some characters of the multi-dimensional posterior that are unavoidably lost in the
marginalization (imagine marginalization as a kind of geometrical projection). Useful quantities
are the covariances between parameters θi and θj , defined as
Cov(θi, θj) = E[(θi − E[θi]) (θj − E[θj ])] . (53)
As is well know, quantities which give a more intuitive idea of what is going on are the correlation
coefficients, defined as ρ(θi, θj) = Cov(θi, θj)/σ(θi)σ(θj). Variances and covariances form the
covariance matrix V(θ), with Vii = Var(θi) and Vij = Cov(θi, θj). We recall also that convenient
formulae to calculate variances and covariances are obtained from the expectation of the products
θiθj, together with the expectations of the parameters:
Vij = E(θiθj)− E(θi) E(θj) (54)
As a first example of a multidimensional distribution from a data set, we can think, again, at the
inference of the parameter µ of a Gaussian distribution, but in the case that also σ is unknown
and needs to be determined by the data. From Eqs. (52), (50) and (25), with θ1 = µ and θ2 = σ
and neglecting overall normalization, we obtain
p(µ, σ |d, I) ∝ σ−n exp
[
−
∑n
i=1(di − µ)2
2σ2
]
p(µ, σ | I) (55)
p(µ |d, I) =
∫
p(µ, σ |d, I) dσ (56)
p(σ |d, I) =
∫
p(µ, σ |d, I) dµ . (57)
The closed form of Eqs. (56) and 57) depends on the prior and, perhaps, for the most realistic
choice of p(µ, σ | I), such a compact solution does not exists. But this is not an essential issue,
given the present computational power. (For example, the shape of p(µ, σ | I) can be easily
inspected by a modern graphical tool.) We want to stress here the conceptual simplicity of the
Bayesian solution to the problem. [In the case the data set contains some more than a dozen
of observations, a flat p(µ, σ | I), with the constraint σ > 0, can be considered a good practical
choice.]
5.7 Predictive distributions
A related problem is to ‘infer’ what an experiment will observe given our best knowledge of
the underlying theory and its parameters. Infer is within quote marks because the term is
usually used for model and parameters, rather than for observations. In this case people prefer
to speak about prediction (or prevision). But we recall that in the Bayesian reasoning there is
conceptual symmetry between the uncertain quantities which enter the problem. Probability
density functions describing not yet observed event are referred to as predictive distributions.
There is a conceptual difference with the likelihood, which also gives a probability of observation,
but under different hypotheses, as the following example clarifies.
Given µ and σ, and assuming a Gaussian model, our uncertainty about a ‘future’ df is
described by the Gaussian pdf Eq. (25) with d = df . But this holds only under that particular
hypothesis for µ and σ, while, in general, we are also uncertain about these values too. Applying
the decomposition formula (Tab. 1) we get:
p(df | I) =
∫
p(df |µ, σ, I) p(µ, σ | I) dµ dσ (58)
Again, the integral might be technically difficult, but the solution is conceptually simple. Note
that, though the decomposition formula is a general result of probability theory, it can be applied
to this problem only in the subjective approach.
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An analytically easy, insightful case is that of experiments with well-known σ’s. Given a
past observation dp and a vague prior, p(µ | dp, I) is Gaussian around dp with variance σ2p [note
that, with respect to p(µ, σ | I) of Eq.(58), it has been made explicit that p(µ) depend on dp].
p(df |µ) is Gaussian around µ with variance σ2f . We get finally
p(df | dp, I) =
∫
p(df |µ, I) p(µ | dp, I) dµ (59)
=
1√
2pi
√
σ2p + σ
2
f
exp
[
− (df − dp)
2
2 (σ2p + σ
2
f )
]
. (60)
5.8 Hierarchical modelling and hyperparameters
As we have seen in the previous section, it is often desirable to include in a probabilistic model
one’s uncertainty in various aspects of a pdf. This is a natural feature of the Bayesian methods,
due to the uniform approach to deal with uncertainty and from which powerful analysis tools
are derived. This kind of this modelling is called hierarchical because the characteristics of one
pdf are controlled by another pdf. All uncertain parameters from which the pdf depends are
called hyperparameter. An example of use of hyperparameter is described in Sect. 8.3 in which
the prior to infer θ in a binomial model are shown to be controlled by the parameters of a Beta
distribution.
As an example of practical importance, think of the combination of experimental results
in the presence of outliers, i.e. of data points which are somehow in mutual disagreement. In
this case the combination rule given by Eqs. (30)–(32), extended to many data points, pro-
duces unacceptable conclusions. A way of solving the problem (Dose and von der Linden 1999,
D’Agostini 1999b) is to model a scepticism about the quoted standard deviations of the exper-
iments, introducing a pdf f(r), where r is a rescaling factor of the standard deviation. In this
way the σ’s that enter the r.h.s. of Eqs. (30)–(32) are hyperparameters of the problem. An
alternative approach, also based on hierarchical modelling, is shown in (Fro¨hner 2000). For a
more complete introduction to the subject see e.g. (Gelman et al 1995).
5.9 From Bayesian inference to maximum-likelihood and minimum chi-
square model fitting
Let us continue with the case in which we know so little about appropriate values of the param-
eters that a uniform distribution is a practical choice for the prior. Equation (52) becomes
p(θ |d, I) ∝ p(d |θ, I) p0(θ, I) ∝ p(d |θ, I) = L(θ;d) , (61)
where, we recall, the likelihood L(θ;d) is seen as a mathematical function of θ, with parameters
d.
The set of θ that is most likely is that which maximizes L(θ;d), a result known as the
maximum likelihood principle. Here it has been obtained again as a special case of a more
general framework, under clearly stated hypotheses, without need to introduce new ad hoc
rules. Note also that the inference does not depend on multiplicative factors in the likelihood.
This is one of the ways to state the likelihood principle, ideally desired by frequentists, but often
violated. This ‘principle’ always and naturally holds in Bayesian statistics. It is important to
remark that the use of unnecessary principles is dangerous, because there is a tendency to use
them uncritically. For example, formulae resulting from maximum likelihood are often used also
when non-uniform reasonable priors should be taken into account, or when the shape of L(θ;d)
is far from being multi-variate Gaussian. (This is a kind of ancillary default hypothesis that
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comes together with this principle, and is the source of the often misused ‘∆(− lnL) = 1/2’ rule
to determine probability intervals.)
The usual least squares formulae are easily derived if we take the well-known case of pairs
{xi, yi} (the generic d stands for all data points) whose true values are related by a deterministic
function µyi = y(µxi ,θ) and with Gaussian errors only in the ordinates, i.e. we consider xi ≈ µxi .
In the case of independence of the measurements, the likelihood-dominated result becomes,
p(θ |x,y, I) ∝
∏
i
exp
[
−(yi − y(xi,θ))
2
2σ2i
]
(62)
or
p(θ |x,y, I) ∝ exp
[
−1
2
χ2
]
, (63)
where
χ2(θ) =
∑
i
(yi − y(xi,θ))2
σ2i
(64)
is called ‘chi-square,’ well known among physicists. Maximizing the likelihood is equivalent to
minimizing χ2, and the most probable value of θ is easily obtained (i.e. the mode indicated with
θm), analytically in easy cases, or numerically for more complex ones.
As far as the uncertainty in θ is concerned, the widely-used evaluation of the covariance
matrix V(θ) (see Sect. 5.6) from the Hessian,
(V −1)ij(θ) =
1
2
∂2χ2
∂θi∂θj
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θm
, (65)
is merely consequence of an assumed multi-variate Gaussian distribution of θ, that is a parabolic
shape of χ2 (note that the ‘∆(− lnL) = 1/2’ rule, and the from this rule resulting ‘∆χ2 = 1
rule,’ has the same motivation). In fact, expanding χ2(θ) in series around its minimum, we have
χ2(θ) ≈ χ2(θm) + 1
2
∆θT H∆θ (66)
where ∆θ stands for the the set of differences θi − θmi and H is the Hessian matrix, whose
elements are given by twice the r.s.h. of Eq. (65). Equation (63) becomes then
p(θ |x,y, I) ≈ ∝ exp
[
−1
2
∆θT H∆θ
]
, (67)
which we recognize to be a multi-variate Gaussian distribution if we identify H = V−1. After
normalization, we get finally
p(θ |x,y, I) ≈ (2pi)−n/2 (detV)−1/2 exp
[
−1
2
∆θT V−1∆θ
]
, (68)
with n equal to the dimension of θ and detV indicating the determinant of V. Holding this
approximation, E(θ) is approximately equal to θm. Note that the result (68) is exact when
y(µxi ,θ) depends linearly on the various θi.
In routine applications, the hypotheses that lead to the maximum likelihood and least squares
formulae often hold. But when these hypotheses are not justified, we need to characterize the
result by the multi-dimensional posterior distribution p(θ), going back to the more general
expression Eq. (52).
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The important conclusion from this section, as was the case for the definitions of probability
in Sect. 3, is that Bayesian methods often lead to well-known conventional results, but without
introducing them as new ad hoc rules as the need arises. The analyst acquires then a heightened
sense of awareness about the range of validity of the methods. One might as well use these
‘recovered’ methods within the Bayesian framework, with its more natural interpretation of the
results. Then one can speak about the uncertainty in the model parameters and quantify it with
probability values, which is the usual way in which physicists think.
5.10 Gaussian approximation of the posterior distribution
The substance of the results seen in the previous section holds also in the case in which the prior
is not flat and, hence, cannot be absorbed in the normalization constant of the posterior. In
fact, in many practical cases the posterior exhibits an approximately (multi-variate) Gaussian
shape, even if the prior was not trivial. Having at hand an un-normalized posterior p˜(), i.e.
p˜(θ |d, I) = p(d |θ, I) p0(θ, I) , (69)
we can take its minus-log function ϕ(θ) = − ln p˜(θ). If p˜(θ |x,y, I) has approximately a Gaus-
sian shape, it follows that
ϕ(θ) ≈ 1
2
∆θT V−1∆θ + constant . (70)
V can be evaluated as
(V −1)ij(θ) ≈ ∂
2ϕ
∂θi∂θj
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θm
, (71)
where θm was obtained from the minimum of ϕ(θ).
6 Uncertainties from systematic effects
The uncertainty described in the previous section are related to the so-called random, or statis-
tical errors. Other important sources are, generally speaking (see ISO 1993 for details), related
to uncertain values of influence variables on which the observed values, or the data-analysis pro-
cess, might depend. In physics, we usually refer to these as systematic effects or errors. They
can be related to the parameters of the experiment, like a particle beam energy or the exposure
time, or to environmental variables, like temperature and pressure, calibration constants of the
detector, and all other parameters, ‘constants’ (in the physical sense), and hypotheses that enter
the data analysis. The important thing is that we are unsure about their precise value. Let us
indicate all the influence variables with the vector h = {h1, h2, . . . , hn}, and their joint pdf as
p(h | I).
The treatment of uncertainties due to systematic errors has traditionally been lacking a
consistent theory, essentially due the unsuitability to standard statistical methods of dealing
with uncertainty in the most wide sense. Bayesian reasoning becomes crucial to handle these
sources of uncertainty too, and even metrological organizations (ISO 1993) had to recognized it.
For example, the ISO type B uncertainty is recommended to be “evaluated by scientific judgment
based on all the available information on the possible variability” (ISO 1993) of the influence
quantities (see also D’Agostini 1999c).
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6.1 Reweighting of conditional inferences
The values of the influence variables and their uncertainties contribute to our background knowl-
edge I about the experimental measurements. Using I0 to represent our very general background
knowledge, the posterior pdf will then be p(µ |d,h, I0), where the dependence on all possible
values of h has been made explicit. The inference that takes into account the uncertain vector
h is obtained using the rules of probability (see Tab. 1) by integrating the joint probability over
the uninteresting influence variables:
p(µ |d, I0) =
∫
p(µ,h |d, I0) dh (72)
=
∫
p(µ |d,h, I0) p(h | I0) dh . (73)
As a simple, but important case, let us consider a single influence variable given by an additive
instrumental offset z, which is expected to be zero because the instrument has been calibrated
as well as feasible and the remaining uncertainty is σz. Modelling our uncertainty in z as a
Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation σz, the posterior for µ is
p(µ | d, I0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
p(µ | d, z, σ, I0) p(z |σz, I0) dz (74)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
1√
2pi σ
exp
[
−(µ− (d− z))
2
2σ2
]
×
1√
2pi σz
exp
[
− z
2
2σ2z
]
dz (75)
=
1√
2pi
√
σ2 + σ2z
exp
[
− (µ− d)
2
2 (σ2 + σ2z)
]
. (76)
The result is that the net variance is the sum of the variance in the measurement and the
variance in the influence variable.
6.2 Joint inference and marginalization of nuisance parameters
A different approach, which produces identical results, is to think of a joint inference about both
the quantities of interest and the influence variables:
p(µ,h |d, I0) ∝ p(d |µ,h, I0) p0(µ,h | I0) . (77)
Then, marginalization is applied to the variables that we are not interested in (the so called
nuisance parameters), obtaining
p(µ|d, I0) =
∫
p(µ,h |d, I0) dh (78)
∝
∫
p(d |µ,h, I0) p0(µ,h | I0) dh . (79)
Equation (77) shows a peculiar feature of Bayesian inference, namely the possibility making an
inference about a number of variables larger than the number of the observed data. Certainly,
there is no magic in it, and the resulting variables will be highly correlated. Moreover, the
prior cannot be improper in all variables. But, by using informative priors in which experts
feel confident, this feature allows one to tackle complex problems with missing or corrupted
parameters. In the end, making use of marginalization, one can concentrate on the quantities
of real interest.
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The formulation of the problem in terms of Eqs. (77) and (79) allows one to solve problems in
which the influence variables might depend on the true value µ, because p0(µ,h | I0) can model
dependences between µ and h. In most applications, h does not depend on µ, and the prior
factors into the product of p0(µ | I0) and p0(h | I0). When this happens, we recover exactly the
same results as obtained using the reweighting of conditional inferences approach described just
above.
6.3 Correlation in results caused by systematic errors
We can easily extend Eqs. (73), (77), and (79) to a joint inference of several variables, which,
as we have seen, are nothing but parameters θ of suitable models. Using the alternative ways
described in Sects. 6.1 and 6.2, we have
p(θ |d,h, I0) ∝ p(d |θ,h, I0) p0(θ | I0) (80)
p(θ |d, I0) =
∫
p(θ |d,h, I0) p(h | I0) dh (81)
and
p(θ,h |d, I0) ∝ p(d |θ,h, I0) p0(θ,h | I0) (82)
p(θ|d, I0) =
∫
p(θ,h |d, I0) dh , (83)
respectively. The two ways lead to an identical result, as it can be seen comparing Eqs. (81)
and (83).
Take a simple case of a common offset error of an instrument used to measure various quan-
tities µi, resulting in the measurements di. We model each measurement as µi plus an error that
is Gaussian distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation σi. The calculation of the
posterior distribution can be performed analytically, with the following results (see D’Agostini
1999c for details):
• The uncertainty in each µi is described by a Gaussian centered at di, with standard
deviation σ(µi) =
√
σ2i + σ
2
z , consistent with Eq. (76).
• The joint posterior distribution p(µ1, µ2, . . .) does not factorize into the product of p(µ1),
p(µ2), etc., because correlations are automatically introduced by the formalism, consistent
with the intuitive thinking of what a common systematic should do. Therefore, the joint
distribution will be a multi-variate Gaussian that takes into account correlation terms.
• The correlation coefficient between any pair {µi, µj} is given by
ρ(µi, µj) =
σ2z
σ(µi)σ(µj)
=
σ2z√
(σ2i + σ
2
z) (σ
2
j + σ
2
z)
. (84)
We see that ρ(µi, µj) has the behavior expected from a common offset error; it is non-
negative; it varies from practically zero, indicating negligible correlation, when (σz ≪ σi),
to unity (σz ≫ σi), when the offset error dominates.
6.4 Approximate methods and standard propagation applied to systematic
errors
When we have many uncertain influence factors and/or the model of uncertainty is non-Gaussian,
the analytic solution of Eq. (73), or Eqs. (77)–(79) can be complicated, or not existing at all.
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Then numeric or approximate methods are needed. The most powerful numerical methods are
based on Monte Carlo (MC) techniques (see Sect. 9 for a short account). This issue goes beyond
the aim of this report. In a recent comprehensive particle-physics paper by Ciuchini et al (2001),
these ideas have been used to infer the fundamental parameters of the Standard Model of particle
physics, using all available experimental information.
For routine use, a practical approximate method can be developed by thinking of the value
inferred for the expected value of h as a raw value, indicated with µR, that is, µR = µ
∣∣∣h=E(h)
(‘raw’ in the sense that it needs later to be ‘corrected’ for all possible value of θ, as it will be
clear in a while). The value of µ, which depends on the possible values of h, can be seen as a
function of µR and h:
µ = f(µR,h) . (85)
We have thus turned our inferential problem into a standard problem of evaluation of the pdf of a
function of variables, of which are particularly known the formulae to obtain approximate values
for expectations and standard deviations in the case of independent input quantities (following
the nomenclature of ISO 1993):
E(µ) ≈ f(E(µR),E(h)) (86)
σ2(µ) ≈
(
∂f
∂µR
∣∣∣∣
E(µR),E(h)
)2
σ2(µR)
+
∑
i
(
∂f
∂hi
∣∣∣∣
E(µR),E(h)
)2
σ2(hi) . (87)
Extension to multi-dimensional problems and treatment of correlations is straightforward (the
well-known covariance matrix propagation) and we refer to (D’Agostini and Raso 1999) for
details. In particular, this reference contains approximate formulae valid up to second order,
which allow to take into account relatively easily non linearities.
7 Comparison of models of different complexity
We have seen so far two typical inferential situations:
1. Comparison of simple models (Sect. 4), where by simple we mean that the models do not
depend on parameters to be tuned to the experimental data.
2. Parametric inference given a model, to which we have devoted the last sections.
A more complex situation arises when we have several models, each of which might depend on
several parameters. For simplicity, let us consider model A with nA parameters α and model B
with nB parameters β. In principle, the same Bayesian reasoning seen previously holds:
P (A |Data, I)
P (B |Data, I) =
P (Data |A, I)
P (Data |B, I)
P (A | I)
P (B | I) , (88)
but we have to remember that the probability of the data, given a model, depends on the
probability of the data, given a model and any particular set of parameters, weighted with the
prior beliefs about parameters. We can use the same decomposition formula (see Tab. 1), already
applied in treating systematic errors (Sect. 6):
P (Data |M, I) =
∫
P (Data |M,θ, I) p(θ | I) dθ , (89)
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with M = A,B and θ = α,β. In particular, the Bayes factor appearing in Eq. (88) becomes
P (Data |A, I)
P (Data |B, I) =
∫
P (Data |A,α, I) p(α | I) dα∫
P (Data |B,β, I) p(β | I) dβ (90)
=
∫LA(α; Data) p0(α) dα∫LB(β; Data) p0(β) dβ . (91)
The inference depends on the marginalized likelihood (89), also known as the evidence. Note that
LM (θ; Data) has its largest value around the maximum likelihood point θML, but the evidence
takes into account all prior possibilities of the parameters. Thus, it is not enough that the best
fit of one model is superior to its alternative, in the sense that, for instance,
LA(αML; Data) > LB(βML; Data) , (92)
and hence, assuming Gaussian models,
χ2A(αminχ2 ; Data) < χ
2
B(βminχ2 ; Data) , (93)
to prefer model A. We have already seen that we need to take into account the prior beliefs in
A and B. But even this is not enough: we also need to consider the space of possibilities and
then the adaptation capability of each model. It is well understood that we do not choose an
(n− 1) order polynomial as the best description – ‘best’ in inferential terms – of n experimental
points, though such a model always offers an exact pointwise fit. Similarly, we are much more
impressed by, and we tend a posteriori to believe more in, a theory that absolutely predicts an
experimental observation, within a reasonable error, than another theory that performs similarly
or even better after having adjusted many parameters.
This intuitive reasoning is expressed formally in Eqs. (90) and (91). The evidence is given
integrating the product L(θ) and p0(θ) over the parameter space. So, the more p0(θ) is concen-
trated around θML, the greater is the evidence in favor of that model. Instead, a model with a
volume of the parameter space much larger than the one selected by L(θ) gets disfavored. The
extreme limit is that of a hypothetical model with so many parameters to describe whatever
we shall observe. This effect is very welcome, and follows the Ockham’s Razor scientific rule of
discarding unnecessarily complicated models (“entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily”).
This rule comes out of the Bayesian approach automatically and it is discussed, with examples
of applications in many papers. Berger and Jefferys (1992) introduce the connection between
Ockham’s Razor and Bayesian reasoning, and discuss the evidence provided by the motion of
Mercury’s perihelion in favor of Einstein’s general relativity theory, compared to alternatives at
that time. Examples of recent applications are Loredo and Lamb 2002 (analysis of neutrinos
observed from supernova SN 1987A), John and Narlikar 2002 (comparisons of cosmological mod-
els), Hobson et al 2002 (combination of cosmological datasets) and Astone et al 2003 (analysis
of coincidence data from gravitational wave detectors). These papers also give a concise account
of underlying Bayesian ideas.
After having emphasized the merits of model comparison formalized in Eqs. (90) and (91),
it is important to mention a related problem. In parametric inference we have seen that we can
make an easy use of improper priors (see Tab. 1), seen as limits of proper priors, essentially
because they simplify in the Bayes formula. For example, we considered p0(µ | I) of Eq. (26)
to be a constant, but this constant goes to zero as the range of µ diverges. Therefore, it does
simplify in Eq. (26), but not, in general, in Eqs. (90) and (91), unless models A and B depend
on the same number of parameters defined in the same ranges. Therefore, the general case of
model comparison is limited to proper priors, and needs to be thought through better than when
making parametric inference.
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8 Choice of priors – a closer look
So far, we have considered mainly likelihood-dominated situations, in which the prior pdf can
be included in the normalization constant. But one should be careful about the possibility
of uncritically use uniform priors, as a ‘prescription,’ or as a rule, though the rule might be
associated with the name of famous persons. For instance, having made N interviews to infer
the proportion θ of a population that supports a party, it is not reasonable to assume a uniform
prior of θ between 0 and 1. Similarly, having to infer the rate r of a Poisson process (such
that λ = r T , where T is the measuring time) related, for example, to proton decay, cosmic ray
events or gravitational wave signals, we do not believe, strictly, that p(r) is uniform between
zero and infinity. Besides natural physical cut-off’s (for example, very large proton decay r
would prevent Life, or even stars, to exist), p(r) = constant implies to believe more high orders
of magnitudes of r (see Astone and D’Agostini 1999 for details). In many cases (for example the
mentioned searches for rare phenomena) our uncertainty could mean indifference over several
orders of magnitude in the rate r. This indifference can be parametrized roughly with a prior
uniform ln r yielding p(r) ∝ 1/r (the same prior is obtainable using invariant arguments, as it
will be shown in a while).
As the reader might imagine, the choice of priors is a highly debated issue, also among
Bayesians. We do not pretend to give definitive statements, but would just like to touch on
some important issues concerning priors.
8.1 Logical and practical role of priors
Priors are pointed to by those critical of the Bayesian approach as the major weakness of the
theory. Instead, Bayesians consider them a crucial and powerful key point of the method.
Priors are logically crucial because they are necessary to make probability inversions via Bayes’
theorem. This point remains valid even in the case in which they are vague and apparently
disappear in the Bayes’ formula. Priors are powerful because they allow to deal with realistic
situations in which informative prior knowledge can be taken into account and properly balanced
with the experimental information.
Indeed, we think that one of the advantages of Bayesian analysis is that it explicitly admits
the existence of prior information, which naturally leads to the expectation that the prior will
be specified in any honest account of a Bayesian analysis. This crucial point is often obscured in
other types of analyses, in large part because the analysts maintain their method is ‘objective.’
Therefore, it is not easy, in those analyses, to recognize what are the specific assumptions made
by the analyst — in practice the analyst’s priors — and the assumptions included in the method
(the latter assumptions are often unknown to the average practitioner).
8.2 Purely subjective assessment of prior probabilities
In principle, the point is simple, at least in one-dimensional problem in which there is good
perception of the possible range in which the uncertain variable of interest could lie: try your
best to model your prior beliefs. In practice, this advice seems difficult to follow because, even if
we have a rough idea of what the value of a quantity should be, the representation of the prior in
mathematical terms seems very committal, because a pdf implicitly contains an infinite number
of precise probabilistic statements. (Even the uniform distribution says that we believe exactly in
the same way to all values. Who believes exactly that?) It is then important to understand that,
when expressing priors, what matters is not the precise mathematical formula, but the gross
value of the probability mass indicated by the formula, how probabilities are intuitively perceived
and how priors influence posteriors. When we say, intuitively, we believe something with a 95%
confidence, it means “we are almost sure,” but the precise value (95%, instead of 92% or 98%)
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is not very relevant. Similarly, when we say that the prior knowledge is modeled by a Gaussian
distribution centered around µ0 with standard deviation σ0 [Eq. (28)], it means means that we
are quite confident that µ is within ±σ0, very sure that it is within ±2σ0 and almost certain
that it is within ±3σ0. Values even farther from µ0 are possible, though we do not consider
them very likely. But all models should be taken with a grain of salt, remembering that they are
often just mathematical conveniences. For example, a textbook-Gaussian prior includes infinite
deviations from the expected value and even negative values for physical quantities positively
defined, like a temperature or a length. All absurdities, if taken literally. On the other hand, we
think that all experienced physicists have in mind priors with low probability long tails in order
to accommodate strong deviation from what is expected with highest probability. (Remember
that where the prior is zero, the posterior must also be zero.)
Summing up this point, it is important to understand that a prior should tell where the
probability mass is concentrated, without taking too seriously the details, especially the tails
of the distribution (which should be, however, enough extended to accommodate ’surprises’).
The nice feature of Bayes’ theorem is the ability of trasform such vague, fuzzy priors into solid
estimates, if a sufficient amount of good quality data are at hand. For this reason, the use
of improper priors is not considered to be problematic. Indeed, improper priors can just be
considered a convenient way of modelling relative beliefs.
In the case we have doubts about the choice of the prior, we can consider a family of functions
with some hyperparameters. If we worry about the effect of the chosen prior on the posterior,
we can perform a sensitivity analysis, i.e. to repeat the analysis for different, reasonable choices
of the prior and check the variation of the result. The final uncertainty could, then, take into
account also the uncertainty on the prior. Finally, in extreme cases in which priors play a crucial
role and could dramatically change the conclusions, one should refrain to give probabilistic result,
providing, instead, only Bayes factors, or even just likelihoods. An example of a recent result
about gravitational wave searches presented in this way, see Astone et al (2002).
Having clarified meaning and role of priors, it is rather evident that the practical choice of a
prior depends on what is appropriate for the application. For example, in the area of imaging,
smoothness of a reconstructed image might be appropriate in some situations. Smoothness may
be imposed by a variety of means, for example, by simply setting the logarithm of the prior
equal to an integral of the square of the second derivative of the image (von der Linden et al
1996b). A more sophisticated approach goes under the name of Markov random fields (MRF),
which can even preserve sharp edges in the estimated images (Bouman and Sauer 1993, Saquib
et al 1997). A similar kind of prior is often appropriate for defomable geometric models, which
can be used to represent the boundaries between various regions, for example, organs in medical
images (Cunningham et al 1998).
A procedure that helps in choosing the prior, expecially important in the cases in which
the parameters do not have a straightforwardly perceptible influence on data, is to build a
prior predictive pdf and check if this pdf would produce data conform with our prior beliefs.
The prior predictive distribution is the analogue of the (posterior) predictive distribution we
met in Sect. 5.7, with p(θ |d, I) replaced by p(θ | I) (note that the example of Sect. 5.7 was
one-dimensional, with d1 = df and θ1 = µ), i.e. p(d | I) =
∫
p(d |θ, I) p(θ | I) dθ.
Often, expecially in complicated data analyses, we are not sufficiently knowledgable about
the details of the problem. Thus, informative priors have to be modelled that capture the
judgement of experts. For example, Meyer and Booker (2001) show a formal process of prior
elicitation which has the aim at reducing, as much as possible, the bias in the experts’ estimates
of their confidence limits. This approach allows one to combine the results from several experts.
In short, we can suggest the use of the ‘coherent bet’ (Sect. 2) to force experts to access their
values of probability, asking them to provide an interval in which they feel ‘practically sure’,
intervals on which they could wager 1:1, and so on.
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8.3 Conjugate priors
Because of computational problems, modelling priors has been traditionally a compromise be-
tween a realistic assessment of beliefs and choosing a mathematical function that simplifies the
analytic calculations. A well-known strategy is to choose a prior with a suitable form so the
posterior belongs to the same functional family as the prior. The choice of the family depends on
the likelihood. A prior and posterior chosen in this way are said to be conjugate. For instance,
given a Gaussian likelihood and choosing a Gaussian prior, the posterior is still Gaussian, as we
have seen in Eqs. (25), (28) and (29). This is because expressions of the form
K exp
[
−(x1 − µ)
2
2σ21
− (x2 − µ)
2
2σ22
]
can always be written in the form
K ′ exp
[
−(x
′ − µ)2
2σ′2
]
,
with suitable values for x′, σ′ and K ′. The Gaussian distribution is auto-conjugate. The
mathematics is simplified but, unfortunately, only one shape is possible.
An interesting case, both for flexibility and practical interest is offered by the binomial
likelihood (see Sect. 5.3). Apart from the binomial coefficient, p(n | θ,N) has the shape θn(1 −
θ)N−n, which has the same structure as the Beta distribution, well known to statisticians:
Beta(θ | r, s) = 1
β(r, s)
θr−1(1− θ)s−1
{
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
r, s > 0
, (94)
where β(r, s) stands for the Beta function, defined as
β(r, s) =
∫ 1
0
θr−1(1− θ)s−1 dθ (95)
which can be expressed in terms of Euler’s Gamma function as β(r, s) = Γ(r) Γ(s)/Γ(r + s).
Expectation and variance of the Beta distribution are:
E(θ) =
r
r + s
(96)
σ2(θ) =
r s
(r + s+ 1)(r + s)2
= E2(θ)
s
r
1
r + s+ 1
. (97)
If r > 1 and s > 1, then the mode is unique, and it is at θm = (r − 1)/(r + s − 2). Depending
on the value of the parameters the Beta pdf can take a large variety of shapes. For example, for
large values of r and s, the function is very similar to a Gaussian distribution, while a constant
function is obtained for r = s = 1. Using the Beta pdf as prior function in inferential problems
with a binomial likelihood, we have
p(θ |n,N, r, s) ∝
[
θn(1− θ)N−n
] [
θr−1(1− θ)s−1
]
(98)
∝ θn+r−1(1− θ)N−n+s−1 . (99)
The posterior distribution is still a Beta with r′ = r+n and s′ = s+N−n, and expectation and
standard deviation can be calculated easily from Eqs. (96) and (97). These formulae demonstrate
how the posterior estimates become progressively independent of the prior information in the
limit of large numbers; this happens when both m≫ r and n−m≫ s. In this limit, we get the
same result as for a uniform prior (r = s = 1).
Table 2 lists some of the more useful conjugate priors. For a more complete collection of conjugate
priors, see e.g. (Bernardo and Smith 1994, Gelman et al 1995).
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Table 2: Some useful conjugate priors. x and n stand for the observed value (continuous or
discrete, respectively) and θ is the generic symbol for the parameter to infer, corresponding to
µ of a Gaussian, θ of a binomial and λ of a Poisson distribution.
likelihood conjugate prior posterior
p(x | θ) p0(θ) p(θ |x)
Normal(θ, σ) Normal(µ0, σ0) Normal(µ1, σ1) [Eqs. (30)–(32)]
Binomial(N, θ) Beta(r, s) Beta(r + n, s+N − n)
Poisson(θ) Gamma(r, s) Gamma(r + n, s+ 1)
Multinomial(θ1, . . . , θk) Dirichlet(α1, . . . , αk) Dirichlet(α1 + n1, . . . , αk + nk)
8.4 General principle based priors
Many who advocate using the Bayesian approach still want to keep ‘subjective’ contributions to
the inference to a minimum. Their aim is to derive prior functions based on ‘objective’ arguments
or general principles. As the reader might guess, this subject is rather controversial, and the risk
of trasforming arguments, which might well be reasonable and useful in many circumstances,
into dogmatic rules is high (D’Agostini, 1999e).
8.4.1 Transformation invariance
An important class of priors arises from the requirement of transformation invariance. We shall
consider two specific cases, translation invariance and scale invariance.
Translation invariance
Let us assume we are indifferent over a transformation of the kind θ′ = θ + b, where θ is
our variable of interest and b a constant. Then p(θ) dθ is an infinitesimal mass element of
probability for θ to be in the interval dθ. Translation invariance requires that this mass
element remains unchanged when expressed in terms of θ′, i.e.
p(θ) dθ = p(θ′) dθ′ (100)
= p(θ + b) dθ , (101)
since dθ = dθ′. It is easy to see that in order for Eq. (101) to hold for any b, p(θ) must be
equal to a constant for all values of θ from −∞ to +∞. It is therefore an improper prior.
As discussed above, this is just a convenient modelling. For practical purposes this prior
should always be regarded as the limit for ∆θ → ∞ of p(θ) = 1/∆θ, where ∆θ is a large
finite range around the values of interest.
Scale invariance
In other cases, we could be indifferent about a scale transformation, that is θ′ = β θ, where
β is a constant. This invariance implies, since dθ′ = β dθ in this case,
p(θ) dθ = p(β θ)β dθ , (102)
i.e.
p(β θ) =
p(θ)
β
. (103)
The solution of this functional equation is
p(θ) ∝ 1
θ
, (104)
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as can be easily proved using Eq. (104) as test solution in Eq. (103). This is the famous
Jeffreys’ prior, since it was first proposed by Jeffreys. Note that this prior also can be
stated as p(log θ) = constant, as can be easily verified. The requirement of scale invariance
also produces an improper prior, in the range 0 < θ <∞. Again, the improper prior must
be understood as the limit of a proper prior extending several orders of magnitude around
the values of interest. [Note that we constrain θ to be positive because, traditionally,
variables which are believed to satisfy this invariance are associated with positively defined
quantities. Indeed, Eq. (104) has a symmetric solution for negative quantities.]
According to the supporters of these invariance motivated priors (see e.g. Jaynes 1968, 1973,
1998, Sivia 1997, and Fro¨hner 2000, Dose 2002) variables associated to translation invariance
are location parameters, as the parameter µ in a Gaussian model; variables associated to scale
invariance are scale parameters, like σ in a Gaussian model or λ in a Poisson model. For criticism
about the (mis-)use of this kind of prior see (D’Agostini 1999d).
8.4.2 Maximum-entropy priors
Another principle-based approach to assigning priors is based on in the Maximum Entropy
principle (Jaynes 1957a, also 1983, 1998, Tribus 1969, von der Linden 1995, Sivia 1997, and
Fro¨hner 2000). The basic idea is to choose the prior function that maximizes the Shannon-
Jaynes information entropy,
S = −
n∑
i
pi ln pi , (105)
subject to whatever is assumed to be known about the distribution. The larger S is, the
greater is our ignorance about the uncertain value of interest. The value S = 0 is obtained
for a distribution that concentrates all the probability into a single value. In the case of no
constraint other than normalization, (
∑n
i pi = 1), S is maximized by the uniform distribution,
pi = 1/n, which is easily proved using Lagrange multipliers. For example, if the variable is an
integer between 0 and 10, a uniform distribution p(xi) = 1/11 gives S = 2.40. Any binomial
distribution with n = 10 gives a smaller value, with a maximum of S = 1.88 for θ = 1/2 and a
limit of S = 0 for θ → 0 or or θ → 1, where θ is now the parameter of the binomial that gives
the probability of success at each trial.
Two famous cases of maximum-entropy priors for continuous variables are when the only
information about the distribution is either the expected value or the expected value and the
variance. Indeed, these are special cases of general constraints on the moments of the distribution
Mr (see Tab. 1). For r = 0 and 1, Mr is equal to unity and to the expected value, respectively.
First and second moment together provide the variance (see Tab. 1 and Sect. 5.6). Let us sum
up what the assumed knowledge on the various moments provides [see e.g. (Sivia 1997, Dose
2002)].
Knowledge about M0
Normalization alone provides a uniform distribution over the interval in which the variable
is defined:
p(θ |M0 = 1) = 1
b− a a ≤ θ ≤ b . (106)
This is the extension to continuous variables of the discrete case we saw above.
Knowledge about M0 and M1 [i.e. about E(θ)]
Adding to the constraint M0 = 1 the knowledge about the expectation of the variable,
28
plus the requirement that all non-negative values are allowed, an exponential distribution
is obtained:
p(θ |M0 = 1,M1 ≡ E(θ)) = 1
E(θ)
e−θ/E(θ) 0 ≤ θ <∞ . (107)
Knowledge about M0, M1 and M2 [i.e. about E(θ) and σ(θ)]
Finally, the further constraint provided by the standard deviation (related to first and
second moment by the equation σ2 = M2 −M21 ) yields a prior with a Gaussian shape
independently of the range of θ, i.e.
p(θ |M0 = 1,E(θ), σ(θ)) =
exp
[
− (θ−E(θ))22σ2(θ)
]
∫ b
a exp
[
− (θ−E(θ))22σ2(θ)
]
dθ
a ≤ θ ≤ b .
(108)
The standard Gaussian is recovered when θ is allowed to be any real number.
Note, however, that the counterpart of Eq. (105) for continuous variables is not trivial, since all
pi of Eq. (105) tend to zero. Hence the analogous functional form
∫
p(θ) ln p(θ) dθ no longer has
a sensible interpretation in terms of uncertainty, as remarked by Bernardo and Smith (1994).
The Jaynes’ solution is to introduce a ‘reference’ density m(θ) to make entropy invariant under
coordinate transformation via
∫
p(θ) ln[p(θ)/m(θ)] dθ. (It is important to remark that the first
and the third case discussed above are valid under the assumption of a unity reference density.)
This solution is not universally accepted (see Bernardo and Smith 1994), even though it conforms
to the requirements of dimensional analysis. Anyhow, besides formal aspects and the undeniable
aid of Maximum Entropy methods in complicate problems such as image reconstruction (Buck
and Macauly 1991), we find it very difficult, if not impossible at all, that a practitioner holds that
status of knowledge which give rise to the two celebrated cases discussed above. We find more
reasonable the approach described in Sect. 8.2, that goes the other way around: we have a rough
idea of where the quantity of interest could be, then we try to model it and to summarize it in
terms of expected value and standard deviation. In particular, we find untenable the position of
those who state that Gaussian distribution can only be justified by Maximum Entropy principle.
8.4.3 Reference priors
We conclude this discussion on priors by mentioning ‘reference analysis,’ which is an area of
active research among statisticians. The intention is, similarly to that for other priors motivated
by basic principles, that of “characterizing a ‘non-informative’ or ‘objective’ prior distribution,
representing ‘prior ignorance,’ ‘vague prior knowledge,’ and ‘letting the data speak for themselves’
” (Bernardo and Smith 1994). However, “the problem is more complex than the apparent
intuitive immediacy of these words and phrases would suggest” (Bernardo and Smith 1994,
p. 298):
“Put bluntly: data cannot ever speak entirely for themselves: every prior specification has
some informative posterior or predictive implications; and ‘vague’ is itself much too vague
an idea to be useful. There is no ‘objective’ prior that represents ignorance.
On the other hand, we recognize that there is often a pragmatically important need for
a form of prior to posterior analysis capturing, in some well-defined sense, the notion of the
prior having a minimal effect, relative to the data, on the final inference. Such a reference
analysis might be required as an approximation to actual beliefs; more typically, it might be
required as a limiting ‘what if?’ baseline in considering a range of prior to posterior analyses,
or as a default option when there are insufficient resources for detailed elicitation of actual
prior knowledge.
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. . . From the approach we adopt, it will be clear that the reference prior component of
the analysis is simply a mathematical tool. It has considerable pragmatic importance in
implementing a reference analysis, whose role and character will be precisely defined, but it
is not a privileged, ‘unique non-informative’ or ‘objective’ prior.”
The curious reader may take a look at the (Bernardo and Smith 1994) and references cited
therein, as well as at Bernardo (1997).
9 Computational issues
The application of Bayesian ideas leads to computational problems, mostly related to the cal-
culation of integrals for normalizing the posterior pdf and for obtaining credibility regions, or
simply the moments of the distribution (and, hence, expectations, variances and covariances).
The difficulties become challenging for problems involving many parameters. This is one of the
reasons why Bayesian inference was abandoned at the beginning of the 20th century in favor
of simplified – and simplistic – methods. Indeed, the Bayesian renaissance over the past few
decades is largely due to the emergence of new numerical methods and the dramatic increases
in computational power, along with clarifying work on the foundations of the theory.
9.1 Overview of approximate computational strategies
In previous sections we have already seen some ‘tricks’ for simplifying the calculations. The
main topic of this section will be an introduction to Monte Carlo (MC). But, before doing that,
we think it is important to summarize the various ‘tricks’ here. Much specialized literature is
available on several aspects of computation in statistics. For an excellent review paper on the
subject see (Smith 1991).
Conjugate priors
We discussed this topic in Sect. 8.3, giving a couple of typical simple examples and refer-
ences for a more detailed list of famous conjugate distributions. We want to remark here
that a conjugate prior is a special case of the class of priors that simplify the calculation
of the posterior (the uniform prior is the simplest of this kind of prior).
Gaussian approximation
For reasons that are connected with the central limit theorem, when there is a large amount
of consistent data the posterior tends to be Gaussian, practically independently of the exact
shape of the prior. The (multi-variate) Gaussian approximation, which we encountered in
Sect. 5.10, has an important role for applications, either as a reasonable approximation
of the ‘true’ posterior, or as a starting point for searching for a more accurate description
of it. We also saw that in the case of practically flat priors this method recovers the
well-known minimum chi-square or maximum likelihood methods.
Numerical integration
In the case of low dimensional problems, standard numerical integration using either scien-
tific library functions or the interactive tools of modern computer packages provide an easy
solution to many problems (thanks also to the graphical capabilities of modern programs
which allow the shape of the posterior to be inspected and the best calculation strategy
decided upon). This is a vast and growing subject, into we cannot enter in any depth here,
but we assume the reader is familiar with some of these programs or packages.
Monte Carlo methods
Monte Carlo methodology is a science in itself and it is way beyond our remit to provide
30
an exhaustive introduction to it here. Nevertheless, we would like to introduce briefly
some ’modern’ (though the seminal work is already half a century old) methods which are
becoming extremely popular and are often associated with Bayesian analysis, the so called
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods.
9.2 Monte Carlo methods
9.2.1 Estimating expectations by sampling
The easy part of the Bayesian approach is to write down the un-normalized distribution of
the parameters (Sect. 5.10), given the prior and the likelihood. This is simply p˜(θ |d, I) =
p(d |θ, I) p(θ | I). The difficult task is to normalize this function and to calculate all expectations
in which we are interested, such as expected values, variances, covariances and other moments.
We might also want to get marginal distributions, credibility intervals (or hypervolumes) and so
on. As is well-known, if we were able to sample the posterior (even the un-normalized one), i.e. to
generate points of the parameter space according to their probability, we would have solved the
problem, at least approximately. For example, the one-dimensional histogram of parameter θi
would represent its marginal and would allow the calculation of E(θi) ≈ 〈θi〉, σ(θi) ≈
〈
θ2i
〉−〈θi〉2
and of probability intervals (〈·〉 in the previous formulae stand for arithmetic averages of the
MC sample).
Let us consider the probability function p(x) of the discrete variables x and a function
f(x) of which we want to evaluate the expectation over the distribution p(x). Extending the
one-dimensional formula of Tab. 1 to n dimension we have
E[f(x)] =
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xn
f(x1, . . . , xn) p(x1, . . . , xn) (109)
=
∑
i
f(xi) p(xi) , (110)
where the summation in Eq. (109) is over the components, while the summation in Eq. (110) is
over possible points in the n-dimensional space of the variables. The result is the same.
If we are able to sample a large number of points N according to the probability function
p(x), we expect each point to be generated mi times. The average 〈f(x)〉, calculated from the
sample as
〈f(x)〉 = 1
N
∑
t
f(xt) , (111)
(in which the index is named t as a reminder that this is a sum over a ‘time’ sequence) can also
be rewritten as
〈f(x)〉 =
∑
i
f(xi)
mi
N
, (112)
just grouping together the outcomes giving the same xi. For a very large N , the ratios mi/N
are expected to be ‘very close’ to p(xi) (Bernoulli’s theorem), and thus 〈f(x)〉 becomes a good
approximation of E[f(x)]. In fact, this approximation can be good (within tolerable errors) even
if not all mi are large and, indeed, even if many of them are null. Moreover, the same procedure
can be extended to the continuum, in which case ‘all points’ (∞n) can never be sampled.
For simple distributions there are well-known standard techniques for generating pseudo-
random numbers starting from pseudo-random numbers distributed uniformly between 0 and
1 (computer libraries are available for sampling points according to the most common distri-
butions). We shall not enter into these basic techniques, but will concentrate instead on the
calculation of expectations in more complicated cases.
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9.2.2 Rejection sampling
Let us assume we are able to generate points according to some function g(x), such that, given
a constant c, p(x) ≤ cg(x). We generate x∗ according to g(x) and decide to accept it with
probability p(x∗)/cg(x∗) (i.e. we extract another random number between 0 and 1 and accept
the point if this number is below that ratio). It is easy to show that this procedure reshapes g(x)
to p(x) and that it does not depend on the absolute normalization of p(x) (any normalization
constant can be absorbed in the multiplicative constant c). A trivial choice of g(x), especially
for simple one-dimensional problems, is a uniform distribution (this variation is known as the
hit or miss method), though clearly it can be very inefficient.
9.2.3 Importance sampling
In this method, too, we start from an ‘easy’ function g(x), which ‘we hope’ will approximate
p(x) of interest, of which in fact we know only its un-normalized expression p˜(x). However,
there is no requirement about how g(x) approximates p(x) (but the goodness of approximation
will have an impact on the efficacy of the method), apart from the condition that g(xi) must be
positive wherever p(xi) is positive .
The function g(x) can be used in the calculation of E[f(x)], if we notice that E[f(x)] can
be rewritten as follows:
E[f(x)] =
∫
f(x) p˜(x) dx∫
p˜(x) dx
(113)
=
∫
f(x) [p˜(x)/g(x)] g(x) dx∫
[p˜(x)/g(x)] g(x) dx
(114)
=
Eg [f(x) p˜(x)/g(x)]
Eg [p˜(x)/g(x)]
, (115)
where the the symbol Eg is a reminder that the expectation is calculated over the distribution
g(x). Finally, the strategy can be implemented in the Monte Carlo using Eq. (111) for the two
expectations:
E[f(x)] ≈
∑
t f(xt) p˜(xt)/g(xt)∑
t p˜(xt)/g(xt)
. (116)
From the same sample it is also possible to evaluate the normalization constant, given by the
denominator of Eq. (113), i.e.
Z =
∫
p˜(x) dx ≈ 1
N
∑
t
p˜(xt)
g(xt)
. (117)
The computation of this quantity is particularly important when we are dealing with model
comparison and Z has the meaning of ‘evidence’ (Sect. 7).
It easily to see that the method works well if g(x) overlaps well with p(x). Thus, a proper
choice of g(x) can be made by studying where the probability mass of p(x) is concentrated (for
example finding the mode of the distribution in a numerical way). Often a Gaussian function
is used for g(x), with parameters chosen to approximate p(x) in the proximity of the mode, as
described in Sect. 5.10. In other cases, other functions can be used which have more pronounced
tails, like t-Student or Cauchy distributions. Special techniques, into which we cannot enter here,
allow n independent random numbers to be generated and, subsequently, by proper rotations,
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turned into other numbers which have a correlation matrix equal to that of the multi-dimensional
Gaussian which approximates p(x).
Note, finally, that, contrary to the rejection sampling, importance sampling is not suitable
for generate samples of ‘unweighted events’, such as those routinely used in the planning and
the analysis of many kind experiments, especially particle physics experiments.
9.2.4 Metropolis algorithm
A different class of Monte Carlo methods is based on Markov chains and is known as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo. The basic difference from the methods described above is that the sequence
of generated points takes a kind of random walk in parameter space, instead of each point being
generated, one independently from another. Moreover, the probability of jumping from one
point to an other depends only on the last point and not on the entire previous history (this
is the peculiar property of a Markov chain). There are several MCMC algorithms. One of the
most popular and simple algorithms, applicable to a wide class of problems, is the Metropolis
algorithm (Metropolis et al 1953). One starts from an arbitrary point x0 and generates the
sequence by repeating the following cycle, with xt being the previously selected point at each
iteration:
1. Select a new trial point x∗, chosen according to a symmetric proposal pdf q(θ∗ |θt).
2. Calculate the acceptance probability
A(x∗ |xt) = min
[
1,
p˜(θ∗)
p˜(θt)
]
. (118)
3. Accept x∗ with probability A(xt,x
∗), i.e.
• if p˜(θ∗) ≥ p˜(θt), then accept x∗;
• if p˜(θ∗) < p˜(θt), extract a uniform random number between 0 and 1 and accept x∗ if
the random number is less then p˜(θ∗)/p˜(θt).
If the point is accepted, then xt+1 = x
∗. Otherwise xt+1 = xt
This algorithm allows a jump xt to xt+1 with probability T (xt+1 |xt) (the transition kernel)
equal to A(x∗ |xt) q(θ∗ |θt). The algorithm has a stationary asymptotic distribution equal to
p(x) (i.e. the chain is ergodic) and ensures detailed balance:
p(xt+1)T (xt |xt+1) = p(xt)T (xt+1 |xt) . (119)
By construction, the algorithm does not depend on the normalization constant, since what
matters is the ratio of the pdf’s. The variation of the algorithm in which the proposal pdf q()
is not symmetric is due to Hasting (1970) and for this reason the algorithm is often also called
Metropolis-Hasting. Moreover, what has been described here is the global Metropolis algorithm,
in contrast to the local one, in which a cycle affects only one component of x.
The fact that this algorithm belongs to the class of MCMC gives rise to two problems. First,
each point in the chain has some correlation with the points which immediately preceded it,
and usually the chain moves slowly (and irregularly) from one region in the variable space to
another (note also that, if a proposed point is not accepted, the chain keep the same position
in the next step, and this circumstance can happen several times consecutively). Second, the
initial part of the sequence is strongly influenced by the arbitrary starting point. Therefore, it
is necessary to remove the initial part of the chain.
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Using an MCMC for a complex problem is not an automatic procedure and some tuning is
needed. One of the important things to choose with care is the proposal function. If too small
jumps are proposed, the chain moves too slowly and, can even remain trapped in a subregion
and never sample the rest of the parameter space, if the probability distribution is defined over
disconnected regions. If too large steps are proposed, the proposed points could often fall in
very low probability regions and not be accepted, in which case the chain remains stuck in a
point for many cycles.
For an interesting, insightful introduction to principles and applications of MCMC see (Kass
et al 1998). A nice tutorial is given by (Hanson 2000). A recent application of Bayesian
methods in cosmology, which uses MCMC and contains a pedagogical introduction too, can
be found in (Lewis and Bridle 2002). For a good treatise, freely available on the web, (Neel
1993) is recommended. The reader will find that MCMC techniques are used to solve complex
problems graphically represented in terms of Bayesian networks (also known as belief networks
or simply probabilistic network). This subject, which has revolutionized the way of thinking
artificial intelligence and the uncertainty issues related to it, does beyond the purpose of this
article. The interested reader can find more information in (Pearl 1988, BUGS 1996, Cowell et
al 1999 and Cozman 2001) and references therein.
10 Conclusions
The gain in popularity Bayesian methods have enjoyed in recent years is due to various concep-
tual and practical advantages they have over other approaches, among which are:
• the recovery of the intuitive idea of probability as a valid concept for treating scientific
problems;
• the simplicity and naturalness of the basic tool;
• the capability of combining prior knowledge and experimental information;
• the property permitting automatic updating as soon as new information becomes available;
• the transparency of the methods, which allow the different assumptions upon which an
inference may depend to be checked and changed;
• the high degree of awareness the methods give to the user.
In this article we have seen how to build a theory of uncertainty in measurement as a straight-
forward application of the basic Bayesian ideas, without unnecessary principles or ad hoc pre-
scriptions. In particular, the uncertainty due to systematic errors can be treated in a consistent
and powerful way.
Providing an exact solution for inferential problems can easily lead to computational dif-
ficulties. We have seen several ways to overcome such difficulties, either by using suitable
approximations, or by using modern computational methods. In particular, it has been shown
that the approximate solution often coincides with a ‘conventional’ method, but only under well
defined conditions. Thus, for example, minimum χ2 formulae can be used, with a Bayesian spirit
and with a natural interpretation of the results, in all those routine cases in which the analyst
considers as reasonable the conditions of their validity.
A variety of examples of applications have been shown, or mentioned, in this paper.
Nevertheless, the aim of the author was not to provide a complete review of Bayesian methods
and applications, but rather to introduce those Bayesian ideas that could be of help in
understanding more specialized literature. Compendia of the Bayesian theory are given in
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(Bernardo and Smith 1994, O’Hagan A 1994 and Robert 2001). Classic, influential books are
(Jeffreys 1961, de Finetti 1974, Jaynes 1998). Among the many books introducing Bayesian
methods, (Sivia 1996) is particularly suitable for physicists. Other recommended texts which
treat general aspects of data analysis are (Box and Tiao 1973, Bretthorst 1988, Lee 1989,
Gelman et al 1995, Cowell et al 1999, Denison et al 2002, Press 2002). More specific applications
can be found in the proceedings of the conference series and several web sites. Some useful
starting points for web navigation are given:
ISBA book list http://www.bayesian.org/books/books.html
UAI proceedings http://www2.sis.pitt.edu/ dsl/UAI/uai.html
BIPS http://astrosun.tn.cornell.edu/staff/loredo/bayes/
BLIP http://www.ar-tiste.com/blip.html
IPP Bayesian analysis group http://www.ipp.mpg.de/OP/Datenanalyse/
Valencia meetings http://www.uv.es/∼bernardo/valenciam.html
Maximum Entropy resources http://omega.albany.edu:8008/maxent.html
MCMC preprint service http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/∼mcmc/
I am indebted to Volker Dose and Ken Hanson for extensive discussions concerning the contents
of this paper, as well as for substantial editorial help. The manuscript has also benefited from
comments by Tom Loredo.
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